Apollo-Soyuz: The Joint Hoax?
Chapter 6
Chief Designer: "Delay the launch!" – Minister: "Go!"
Stand-by craft and crew ready for launch but remain grounded
During the launch of any manned spacecraft the cosmonauts are under continuous TV surveillance (Figure 1 left). And later, while in orbit, Mission Control with the assistance of the on-board TV system, is able to monitor the situation in the craft at any time.
Figure 1 (left) During launch and while in orbit, cosmonauts are under continuous TV surveillance – (right) Soyuz 19 was launched with a malfunctioning TV system
Significantly, the Soyuz 19 mission was an exception to this rule (Figure 1 right). On the day of the flight of Soyuz 19, just before the launch, the on-board TV suddenly ‘failed’.1
Scandal at the start
A. Leonov said the following about that day:2, 3
[At the point] when the craft was already on the launch pad, the TV system broke down completely. The chief designer Glushko rushed to call Moscow to delay the launch. But when he returned, the minister Afanasyev, and the deputy head of the Air Force Shatalov said: "We have already given command to start." In orbit Valery Kubasov and I received repair recommendations. Of the [available] tools we only had scissors, a screwdriver and a hunting knife, which I had recently bought for 5 rubles 50 copecks. After the Apollo module was launched its hatch for crew transfer was jammed. The [US] astronauts were repairing the hatch all night long. …These abnormal situations were reported neither by the Soviet nor the American press.
It is extremely difficult to accept this touching story of a knife, scissors and screwdriver and, accordingly, it’s difficult to believe in the total absence of a set of specialist tools on the craft. But since this is a story about a TV repair in orbit, and not about the launch of the craft, this will be discussed it in the next chapter. In the meantime, only the key facts confirmed in4 will be taken into account. These are:
a) The on-board TV failed before launch;
b) The main rocket designer of the country, Academician V.P. Glushko, who was also the General Designer of TsKBEM (OKB-1), the lead developer of both the rocket and the craft along with his deputy, the technical director of the Soviet part of the ASTP, Corresponding Members of the USSR Academy of Sciences K.D. Bushuev both insisted on postponing the launch;
c) The Minister of General Machine-Building Industry ("the rocket" Ministry of the USSR) S.A. Afanasyev and Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Lieutenant-General V.A. Shatalov – contrary to the opinion of the chief developers – gave the command to go.
“On the day of the Soyuz 19 launch (July 15, 1975) the technological plan foresaw almost parallel work on two craft, Nos.75 and 76. They fully implemented all fire safety measures. Craft number 74, where some measures were held according to the repair plan, was held in reserve.” (see Chapter 1)
And now, on the launch pad, it was discovered that on-board the Soyuz-M (No. 75), the TV didn’t function.
"Leonov's crew must fly the mission into space!"
Overall, the situation was very unfortunate, but not critical, due to the existence of a standby ready-to-go backup craft (No.76). It was absolutely essential to carry on according to the plan that had long been approved by superiors.
 A. Filipchenko and N. Rukavishnikov, Soyuz 16 (Soyuz-M) |
It was the backup crew (A. Filipchenko and N. Rukavishnikov) who six months previously held a dress rehearsal on the Soyuz 16/Soyuz-M craft – the Soviet component of the ASTP. None of the other Soviet cosmonauts, including A. Leonov and V. Kubasov, had such experience. Therefore the expected instruction would be: send the backup craft, and let Leonov and Kubasov remain on Earth.
But the minister, S.A. Afanasyev, wasn't interested in either the ready-to-go No.76 with an experienced crew, or the firm desire of the chief technical managers to postpone the launch. He just gives the go-ahead to launch the craft with a faulty TV. Moreover, it’ll be repaired while in orbit! Adventurism? Not a chance! He was highly experienced and played a major organizational role in achieving rocket nuclear parity with the United States. The minister was simply following orders from above.
We don't know the exact wording of these orders received from the highest level, but their essence is clear from the minister’s actions. Obviously, only the primary Soyuz 19 crew was aware of the planned TV malfunction. Therefore, no crew other than A. Leonov and V. Kubasov could possibly fly this mission!
A technical meeting held in the absence of V.P. Glushko
The Minister of course didn't doubt that these instructions from above would be fulfilled. But the need for everyone to concur with the decision somehow had to be portrayed. After all, the main developers had backed up the decision to delay the launch. V.P. Glushko himself went off to call the Central Committee (of the CPSU) and ask for the launch to be delayed.
And, while V.P. Glushko was absent, the minister organized a technical meeting. K.D. Bushuev, left alone, "was proposing to delay the launch." "The Technical leadership with participation of the Minister S.A. Afanasyev decided to launch at the appointed time"4
From this account it is clear that for the General Designer V.P. Glushko and his deputy K.D. Bushuev launching the spacecraft with a malfunctioning TV was both completely unacceptable, and totally unexpected. Consequently, both senior technical managers were completely unaware of the clandestine nature of this operation. And what about the ordinary engineers?
It can be confidently asserted that every individual who built specific ASTP equipment was totally unaware that they had all contributed to the cover story of this special operation. Notwithstanding these highly unusual events, the Soyuz-M (factory No.76) craft reached its required orbit with a malfunctioning on-board TV system.
So what happened next?
ISBN: 978-1-898541-19-6
Aulis Publishers, September, 2018
English translation from the Russian by BigPhil
References
Internet links verified January 10, 2018
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